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Reaching Disclosure 
by Carl E. Schneider 
I t is easy to forget but crucial to re-member that when lawmakers de-
cide to regulate an activity, they must 
select a method. The law of bioethics 
particularly favors one method-requir-
ing disclosure of information. The doc-
trine of informed consent obliges doc-
tors to tell patients their treatment 
choices. The administrative law of re-
search ethics insists that researchers warn 
subjects of the risks of experiments. The 
Patient Self-Determination Act compels 
medical institutions to remind patients 
about advance directives. The federal 
government's new privacy regulations 
instrUct medical institutions to describe 
their privacy regime to patients. 
Not just the law of bioethics, but 
health law in general, repeatedly recruits 
disclosure requirements. For example, 
they are central to the recurring propos-
als for patients' bills of rights. Likewise, 
"virtually every bill ... to regulate man-
aged care devotes major portions to. in-
formation disclosure and dissemina-
tion."1 Proposals for "consumer-directed 
health care" tantalize us with the dream 
that well-informed patients can make 
markets for health care work effectively. 
If disclosure requirements are popu-
lar, surely they are effective? Don't peo-
ple making decisions need information, 
want it, and use it? Doesn't an irresistible 
array of arguments justify disclosure 
rules? The moral rationale for disclosure 
is that it liberates people from the servi-
tude to others that ignorance creates. 
The prophylaxis rationale assumes that 
people can be deterred from abusing 
each other by requiring predators to 
warn the prey. The market rationale 
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holds that the production and allocation 
of goods are best regulated through mar-
kets and that markets work best when 
purchasers know most. The welfare ra-
tionale suggests that one way to enhance 
people's well-being is to give them the 
information they need to protect them-
selves. 
Perversely, there is good reason to 
doubt that disclosure requirements in 
health law work as intended. One W-ty 
to assess disclosure rules in health law is 
to ask wheilier. they succeedjn the many 
other area,s oflaw that reqUire them. Are 
people buying worthless stocks? Securi-
ties laws say, "Disclose!" Are people bor-
rowing money at uso/ious rates? Con-
sumer protection laWs say, "Disclose!" 
Are people injured by things they buy? 
Products liability law says, "Disclose!" 
Are police bullying criminal suspects 
into waiving their rights? Miranda says, 
"Disclose!" 
Roughly speaking, the goal of disclo-
sure requirements is to improve the deci-
sions recipients make. The baseline for 
evaluation, then, is the quality of the de-
cisions people would make were there 
no disclosure laws. Crudely defined, 
success means improving decisions 
'enough to justify the costs of the disclo-
sure requirement to the government, the 
disclosers, and the recipients. 
If disclosure requirements prosper 
anywhere, it should be in securities mar-
kets, since they are dominated by insti-
tutions that have incentives and re-
sources to exploit disclosed information. 
But even there, scholars cannot agree 
that companies would disclose less were 
there no securities laws (since companies 
have economic reasons to disclose infor-
mation to investors) or that the disclo-
sures that are made improve investors' 
decisions. 
Nor is it clear that other disclosure 
regimes justify their costs. Take Miranda 
warnings. They '"have little or no effect 
on a suspect's propensity to talk ... Next 
to the warning label on cigarette packs, 
Miranda is the most widely ignored 
piece of official advice in our 
society.' ... Not only has Miranda large-
ly failed to achieve its stated and implic-
it goals, but police have transformed Mi-
randa into a tool of law enforcement."2 
And while the evidence of failure is 
hardly uniform, "the efforts of re-
searchers to prove by scientific means 
that on-product warnings are indeed ef-
fective to modify safety-related behavior 
in actual or simulated real-world appli-
cations have generally yielded disap-
pointing results. "3 
Why don't disclosure requirements 
work better? Principally, disclosure suc-
ceeds only if many often-onerous condi-
tions are all met. Let us briskly review 
eight of them. 
First, information must actually be 
provided. However, disclosers may have 
reasons to withhold it; disclosures cost 
money and can compromise disclosers' 
interest. Disclosers can respond by fol-
lowing the letter of the law but not the 
spirit, by obscuring and even suppress-
ing information, by presenting informa-
tion misleadingly, and by dressing dis-
closures prettily. And disclosure require-
ments are hard to enforce: they usually 
affect so many transactions that the law 
cannot supervise them well, and people 
from whom information is withheld 
rarely are injured enough to make suits 
economically sensible. 
Second, the information disclosed 
must be the right information-rele-
vant, accurate, and complete. However, 
even a willing discloser will often not 
know what to disclose. Some safety 
warnings apparently make people less 
cautious, not more. Some information 
that seems sufficient isn't: Americans 
now overestimate the dangers of smok-
ing, but they still start smoking because 
they underestimate the difficulty of 
stopping. Yet you can't tell people every-
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thing, because that drowns them in 
more information than they can cope 
with. 
Third, the audience must receive the 
information. Often, however, the infor-
mation is and even must be inconspicu-
ous. Further, if found, it may not be 
read: 40 to 44 million Americans, or ap-
proximately one quarter of the U.S. 
population, are functionally illiterate, 
another 50 million have marginal litera-
cy skills, and many of the rest have trou-
ble comprehending even modestly com-
plex verbal and numerical data. 
Fourth, recipients must anend to the 
information they perceive. But recipi-
ents commonly fail to recognize the rel-
evance and significance of information 
or think they already know all they need 
to, and so they are easily convinced that 
the effort of heeding information will 
not be repaid. For example, one "of the 
most consistent findings in the literature 
[on warnings] ... is that a consumer's re-
sponsiveness to warnings is strongly af-
fected by perceived hazardousness." 
Those perceptions are influenced by 
many things, including the product's 
appearance, whether consumers suppose 
they can control the product's dangers, 
whether consumers can imagine ways 
injuries might occur, the product's fa-
miliarity, and consumers' education and 
intelligence. Sadly, "most of these factors 
are difficult to influence."4 
Fifth, people must understand the 
information. This requires the kind of 
analytic effort most of us wisely resist. 
fu Whitehead said, "It is a profoundly 
erroneous truism, repeated by copy-
books and by eminent people when 
they are making speeches, that we 
should cultivate the habit of thinking 
about what we are doing .... Civiliza-
tion advances by extending the number 
of important operations which we can 
perform without thinking about them. 
Operations of thought are like cavalry 
charges in a battle-they are strictly 
limited in number, they require fresh 
horses, and must only be made at deci-
sive moments."5 But even when cavalry 
charges are necessary we don't always 
bring out the fresh horses. 
Sixth, recipients must believe what 
they are told. But people are skeptical. 
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They scout information that does not fit 
their view of the world. Furthermore, 
recipients often have reasons (good and 
bad) to fear that disclosers are shaping 
information to serve their own interests 
and not the recipients'. Such attitudes 
make recipients all too prone to spurn 
even reliable information. 
Seventh, people must decide to use 
the information. But people regularly 
resist incorporating new information 
into decisions, if only because that de-
mands still more work. They must 
therefore be convinced that the infor-
mation will be worth that effort. Some-
times it isn't, but how can they know 
until they have tried? 
Eighth, recipients must use the infor-
mation intelligently. The woeful infre-
quency of this even where you would 
expect it most often is suggested by the 
need for books with titles like Why 
Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes 
and How to Correct Them. Even experi-
enced investors overvalue their own 
judgment, are sooner swayed by vivid 
than by dry data, routinely imagine that 
new evidence . confirms their earlier 
opinions, and suffer from the swarm of 
systematic faults in reasoning that affiict 
us all. And so, "during the Internet fren-
zy, firms that announced that they were 
changing their name to include 
'dot.com' experienced abnormal returns, 
regardless of whether the announce-
ment coincided with a change in busi-
ness plan."6 In short, people's decisions 
do not always change, much less im-
prove, with more informacion. 
Why do lawmakers so often choose 
disclosure requirements when evidence 
for their success is at best elusive and at 
worst damning? In part, the structure of 
lawmaking rarely encourages assess-
ments of disclosure rules. Those rules 
are generally inspired by indignation in-
flamed by anecdote. The effectiveness of 
disclosure seems axiomatic, and there is 
no easy way to test its effectiveness in 
advance. And law is made by just the 
people-the well-educated and well-sit-
uated-best able to take advantage of 
disclosures. 
Furthermore, disclosure may be the 
only kind of regulation available to the 
lawmaking agency. For example, courts 
can create a cause of action against doc-
tors who do not disclose informacion to 
patients, but courts cannot establish an 
administrative apparatus to supervise 
disclosure. And not least, disclosure re-
quirements cost lawmakers little, since 
they shift the costs of regulation to the 
entities being regulated. The Patient 
Self-Determination Act added pennies 
to the federal budget, but it cost hospi-
tals over $100,000,000 just to set up 
compliance programs. Finally, once dis-
closure rules have been implemented, 
courts have no resources for--or interest 
in-reviewing their effectiveness, and 
Congress moves on to other issues. 
This has been an essay about the 
law's choice of means. One of its morals 
is that the law too often chooses means 
badly because it substitutes supposition 
for evidence. Yet the choice matters. 
When the law selects ineffective means, 
problems remain unsolved. Foolish 
means can make problems worse and 
engender new ones. And even bootless 
means divert resources from worthier 
uses. Perhaps legislation is like cavalry 
charges in a battle . . . ? 
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